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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




                                          
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
District Court Judge: The Hon. J. Curtis Joyner
(District Court No. 02-cr-00326)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 28, 2004
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed:   October 6, 2004)
___________
_______________________




On August 25, 2003, before the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Miguel Morales entered a plea of guilty to distributing heroin and aiding and abetting the
distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, respectively.
On November 25, 2003, Morales was sentenced to serve 46 months in prison followed by 3
years of supervised release, and to pay a one hundred dollar assessment and a one thousand
dollar fine.  Morales, through his attorney, filed a timely notice of appeal but has not
submitted an opening brief on appeal.  His counsel, L. Felipe Restrepo, has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
nonfrivolous issues from which to appeal, and further moving that he be permitted to
withdraw as Morales’ counsel.  For the reasons set forth below, we agree that any appeal by
Morales would be without merit.  Accordingly, this Court will grant counsel’s request to
withdraw, and will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court.
I.
As we write solely for the parties, our recitation of the facts will be limited to those
necessary to our determination.  Miguel Morales is a 47-year-old citizen of the Dominican
Republic.  In or around March 1999, an informant working with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration made contact with Morales’ co-defendant, Justo Frias.  The informant
arranged to purchase heroin from Frias.  After obtaining a sample from Frias, the informant
returned to make a larger purchase.  Frias told the informant that he received the heroin from
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Morales.  The informant asked Frias for a lower price, and was taken to meet Morales to
negotiate.  Morales refused to negotiate, and the informant purchased the heroin for the
original price.  Both Morales and Frias were arrested and indicted for, among other things,
distributing heroin and aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin.
On August 25, 2003, Morales pled guilty to count three of the indictment, distributing
heroin and aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin.  Pursuant to a written plea
agreement, the remaining counts were  dismissed and Morales was sentenced to a term of 46
months in prison. 
Morales filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 2003.  Thereafter, L. Felipe Restrepo,
counsel for Morales, filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) and a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.  Morales has not filed a brief on his own
behalf, despite having been informed of his right to file a formal or informal brief.  See
Clerk’s Office Letter (Feb. 17, 2004).
II.
In Anders, the Supreme Court suggested that “if, after a ‘conscientious examination’
of the record, counsel found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, he or she could submit a brief
‘referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.’”  United States
v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).  In Marvin,
we expanded upon the Anders requirements, following the Seventh Circuit’s teachings in
Unites States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1997), by adopting the notion of “the dual
    1 Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states:
Where, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded
that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, trial counsel may
file a motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which shall be served upon the appellant
and the United States.  The United States shall file a brief in response. 
Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been
filed, the clerk will refer the case to a merits panel.  If the panel agrees that
the appeal is without merit, it will grant trial counsel's Anders motion, and
dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds
arguable merit to the appeal, it will discharge current counsel, appoint
substitute counsel, restore the case to the calendar, and order supplemental
briefing.
Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a).
    2 Counsel notes that, unless expressly provided otherwise, all other possible issues for
appeal can be waived through a valid plea agreement, and that no exceptions were
provided for here.  See App. 26-27 (Morales waiving his general right to appeal).
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duties of counsel in the Anders situation.”  Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780.
The dual duties are: “(1) to satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the
record in search of appealable issues; and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Id.
Similarly, this Court must serve two roles: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the
[Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a)’s] requirements1; and (2) whether an
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla,
241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
In arguing that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal, counsel points to three
areas in which issues possibly may be raised: the District Court’s jurisdiction to accept the
guilty plea, the validity of the guilty plea in light of constitutional and statutory standards,
and the legality of the actual sentence imposed.2  After an independent examination of the
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record, including the transcript of the plea colloquy, the Pre-Sentencing Report and the
sentencing, and counsel’s Anders brief, it is clear that counsel has satisfied his Anders burden
and that no nonfrivolous issues from which to appeal exist.
A.  Jurisdiction to Accept the Plea
Counsel easily disposes of any possible jurisdictional defect, noting that the crimes
charged and pled to are federal crimes and that 18 U.S.C § 3231 bestows U.S. district courts
with “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the
laws of the United States.”
B.  Validity of the Plea
The Supreme Court set forth some requirements for a valid plea in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the compliance with which establishes a voluntary and
knowing waiver of the constitutional rights implicated by a plea.  Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 incorporates and expands upon these requirements, creating a list of
information that a judge must impart to the defendant.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.  In essence,
the judge must be satisfied that a factual basis exists for the taking of the plea and that the
defendant is aware of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of entering
the plea.  Id.  Here, all of those requirements were satisfied.  See App. 19, 22, 28, 30-32, 36-
36.  Thus, Morales’ plea entry met the relevant constitutional and statutory standards, and is
valid, leaving no discernable avenues for appeal with respect to the plea.
-6-
C.  The Legality of the Sentence
Counsel explains in his brief that Morales’ sentence complied with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.  The base offense level was 26, given the stipulated to quantity of
heroin involved–149.75 grams.  Although a 2 point increase was recommended in the pre-
sentence report, a defense objection to the increase was sustained.  The deduction for the
acceptance of responsibility and the elimination of supervisory points resulted in a total
deduction of 4 points, giving a final offense level of 21.  This yielded a guideline range of
37-46 months incarceration; Morales was sentenced to the upper bound of that range.  Given
his lack of any prior adult convictions or juvenile adjudications, Morales received no upward
adjustment of sentence due to criminal history.  The fines and the supervised release are
specifically authorized by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (mandating the special assessment);
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (authorizing the fine); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (authorizing the supervised
release).  Although counsel’s Anders brief was submitted  prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we find that, regardless of that
case’s impact on the Sentencing Guidelines, Morales’ sentence was valid, given that no
upward departures were made from the determined range. See United States v. Coplin, No.
03-1570, 2004 WL 1790169, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2004).
III.
For the reasons stated above, we agree with counsel that Morales has no nonfrivolous
issues for appeal.  Accordingly, we grant counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and  affirm Morales’
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conviction and sentence.  Further, we find that the issues discussed herein lack merit for
purposes of counsel filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.  See
Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(b) and (c); see also Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994).
